---
title: "WordPress PDF Plugin Vulnerability: 5 CVEs in 7 Weeks"
slug: "wordpress-pdf-plugin-vulnerability-mpdf"
description: "A WordPress PDF plugin vulnerability hit four form and invoice plugins in 47 days. We read the patches to see what mPDF does with a form field."
date: 2026-11-09
author: "WP Vanguard Team"
category: "Research"
palette: "high"
tags: ["wordpress-pdf-plugin-vulnerability", "cve-2026-102435", "cve-2026-109220", "cve-2026-94666", "cve-2026-94664", "cve-2026-90984", "mpdf", "php-object-injection"]
featured_image: "/images/blog/wordpress-pdf-plugin-vulnerability-mpdf.jpg"
---

Five CVEs were published against four WordPress plugins between September 16 and November 2, 2026, and the plugins have one thing in common: each takes what a visitor typed into a form and turns it into a PDF. It's the same WordPress PDF plugin vulnerability pattern four times, and none of the five needs a login. The newest, CVE-2026-102435, scores 9.8 and sits in Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7, which has 60,000 active installs.

We checked the plugin directories and read the patches. All four plugins bundle mPDF, a PHP library that builds PDFs from HTML. Every fix we could read does the same thing: it cleans form input before that input reaches the PDF step. We found no report of any of these five being exploited as of November 9.

```stat
{"value": "5", "label": "CVEs in 4 PDF plugins in 47 days, all without a login", "note": "September 16 to November 2, 2026. WP Vanguard vulnerability database."}
```

## The five CVEs and where they sit

Here is every entry, with the date our database first saw it and the release that closed it. The titles come from the Wordfence feed.

| CVE | CVSS | Published | Plugin | Fixed in | What the advisory says |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90984 | 7.2 | Sep 16 | Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 | 4.2.2 | Unauthenticated server-side request forgery |
| CVE-2026-94666 | 7.5 | Oct 4 | Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 | 4.2.2 | Unauthenticated arbitrary file read |
| CVE-2026-94664 | 7.5 | Oct 4 | PDF for Contact Form 7 | 7.2.0 | Unauthenticated arbitrary file read |
| CVE-2026-109220 | 9.8 | Oct 30 | PDF Invoice for WooCommerce | 7.2.0 | Unauthenticated PHP object injection to remote code execution via the checkout note field |
| **CVE-2026-102435** | **9.8** | **Nov 2** | **Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7** | **3.5.55** | **Unauthenticated PHP object injection to arbitrary file deletion via a CF7 form field** |

Three things stand out. The two worst scores are both PHP object injection. The two file reads arrived on the same day. And every plugin had already shipped its fix before the CVE appeared.

Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 released 4.2.2 on September 15, a day before its first CVE. PDF for Contact Form 7 released 7.2.0 on September 20, two weeks before its file read went public. Ultra Addons released 3.5.55 on October 11, 22 days before the object injection was published. PDF Invoice for WooCommerce shipped 7.2.0 on October 29, a day before its entry.

## Install base: one plugin carries most of the exposure

Wordpress.org rounds active installs, so treat these as floors. Ultra Addons is the one that matters for sheer numbers.

```bars
{"title": "Active installs", "highlight": "Ultra Addons CF7", "note": "WordPress.org active installs, rounded, November 9, 2026.", "data": [{"label": "Ultra Addons CF7", "value": 60000, "display": "60,000"}, {"label": "Generate PDF CF7", "value": 4000, "display": "4,000"}, {"label": "PDF for CF7", "value": 500, "display": "500"}, {"label": "PDF Invoice Woo", "value": 500, "display": "500"}]}
```

Together that's about 65,000 sites. It's a small family next to the plugins that dominate our radar, but the pattern matters more than the count, because other PDF plugins bundle the same library.

## What the Ultra Addons patch shows

Version 3.5.55's changelog says "Issues reported by Wordfence have been resolved" and "Enhanced overall plugin security." That tells you nothing, so we diffed 3.5.54 against 3.5.55 in the public repository. Version 3.5.57 followed on November 1 with "secure mPDF content handling," so the plugin's own team clearly treats the PDF step as the weak point.

The patched code lives in the plugin's PDF generator add-on. Before the fix, a submitted form value went into the PDF template as-is. After it, a new function cleans every string value first, and it does three jobs:

- It strips mPDF's internal object markers, which the library uses privately while it builds a page.
- It removes stream wrapper prefixes such as `php://`, `file://` and `phar://` from the text.
- It encodes any remaining HTML so tags can't become markup.

The library itself changed too. The bundled mPDF is version 8.3.1, and the patch edits one line so that a call to `unserialize()` now refuses to build objects of any class. Another edit makes mPDF's stream wrapper check catch values that start with stray colons or slashes, which the old test missed.

```
Before: unserialize($sp['objattr'])
After:  unserialize($sp['objattr'], array('allowed_classes' => false))
```

Read together, the changes describe the likely path: a form field carrying mPDF's private markers reaches `unserialize()`, and a PHP object gets built from attacker-controlled data. The advisory title says that object ends up deleting files. We haven't built the chain and won't publish how, and the diff alone doesn't prove it. It does show exactly what the vendor decided to block.

> [!KEY]
> The bug isn't in the form plugin's own logic. It's in the step after: user text goes into a PDF template, and the PDF library trusts parts of that text.

## The same mistake in the other three plugins

We read the other three fixes as well, and they match the idea even though the bugs differ.

Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 fixed 4.2.2 with a short patch. Its readme says it escapes array-valued Contact Form 7 fields before inserting them into the PDF body, and it names the bug as server-side request forgery through HTML injection. Checkbox and multi-select fields arrive as arrays, and the old code joined them with line breaks without escaping each item. A visitor could put HTML in a checkbox value, mPDF would fetch whatever the HTML pointed at, and the server made the request. The file-read entry shipped in the same release.

PDF for Contact Form 7 fixed its file read in 7.2.0. The diff adds `esc_html()` and `wp_kses()` calls around form values and around the shortcode values that go into the template. We didn't trace the specific route, but escaping on the input side is the same repair.

For PDF Invoice for WooCommerce we only have the database record and the version history. The advisory names the customer note field at checkout, and the fix is in 7.2.0. We haven't diffed it, so we won't describe its mechanism.

## Why a WordPress PDF plugin vulnerability keeps repeating

A PDF generator is a sink that most developers don't audit. A form plugin author knows a field might hold a script tag, so they escape it for the web page. Then a second feature takes the same field and passes it to a library that reads HTML, fetches images and follows links, and nobody applies the same care.

Three details make this sink unusually risky:

- mPDF fetches resources on the server, so an injected image or link can reach internal addresses or local files.
- Its internal markers are plain strings, so text can imitate them.
- The library still calls `unserialize()` on one of those values, and the vendor-side fix had to be made inside each plugin's own copy.

That last point isn't only a Ultra Addons story. When we checked mPDF's development branch on GitHub on November 9, the matching line in `src/Mpdf.php` still called `unserialize()` with no class restriction. That doesn't make mPDF itself exploitable, since the plugin stripping the markers is the actual guard here. It does mean each plugin that embeds mPDF has to guard the input, and each one has to remember to.

Directory data also supports a caution about blame. Disclosures follow install base more than plugin age or quality, and the PDF plugins here are small. "Unaudited" is the fair word, not "insecure." Our earlier look at [PHP object injection in WordPress plugins](/blog/php-object-injection-wordpress-plugins) shows how often this class turns a small input bug into code execution, and PDF add-ons are one more place it can hide.

## Who is exposed

You're exposed if all of these hold:

- You run one of the four plugins at a version below the fixed release in the table.
- The PDF feature is switched on and a public form feeds it.
- Visitors don't need an account to submit that form.

A contact form that emails a PDF copy to the site owner counts. So does a WooCommerce checkout that attaches an invoice PDF. If you only use the plugins' non-PDF features, your risk is lower, but we haven't confirmed that disabling the PDF add-on removes the exposure, so updating is the safe answer.

## What to do about these PDF plugin updates now

1. **Update each plugin.** The minimum safe versions are Ultra Addons 3.5.55 (3.5.57 is current and adds more mPDF handling), Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 4.2.2, PDF for Contact Form 7 7.2.0 and PDF Invoice for WooCommerce 7.2.0.
2. **Check what's installed.** Run `wp plugin list --status=active --field=name | grep -i pdf` to find PDF add-ons you forgot about, then `wp plugin get ultimate-addons-for-contact-form-7 --field=version` and the same command for each slug.
3. **Look at the site, not only the version.** The updates stop new attacks. They don't undo an earlier one, and file deletion in particular can break a site without leaving a visible mark. Compare the file list with a backup, and check `wp user list --role=administrator` for accounts you didn't create. Our guide to the [signs your WordPress site has been hacked](/blog/signs-wordpress-site-hacked) covers what else to look for.
4. **Don't wait on the PDF feature.** If you can't update today, turn off the PDF add-on and any PDF attachment on the form until you can.

If you build plugins, apply the lesson from the diffs: escape or strip every user value before it reaches a PDF template, and pass `allowed_classes => false` to any `unserialize()` call you can't remove. For the wider habit, see our [WordPress security checklist](/blog/wordpress-security-checklist).

## Check your own sites

A surface scan is free and compares your installed plugin versions with our vulnerability database, including all five entries above. The [free deep scan](/docs/deep-scan) goes inside the server over SSH and checks users, files and the database, which is where a deletion or code execution attack leaves traces. If it finds something, [Wbcom's engineers can clean it up](https://wbcomdesigns.com/start-a-project/?utm_source=wpvanguard&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wbcom-services&utm_content=blog-wordpress-pdf-plugin-vulnerability-mpdf) for a fixed price. For a repeatable process across many sites, read [how to check WordPress plugins for known vulnerabilities](/blog/check-wordpress-plugins-for-known-vulnerabilities).

The rest of this week's critical updates are in [the plugins to patch this week](/blog/wordpress-plugins-to-patch-this-week).

## References

- [Wordfence Intelligence: CVE-2026-102435, Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7 object injection](https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/187777a4-3438-489c-ad3b-7e16753189d6)
- [WordPress.org: Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7 changelog](https://wordpress.org/plugins/ultimate-addons-for-contact-form-7/#developers)
- [WordPress.org repository: diff of tags 3.5.54 and 3.5.55](https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/ultimate-addons-for-contact-form-7/tags/3.5.55/)
- [WordPress.org repository: Generate PDF using Contact Form 7, tag 4.2.2](https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/generate-pdf-using-contact-form-7/tags/4.2.2/)
- [WordPress.org repository: PDF for Contact Form 7, tag 7.2.0](https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/pdf-for-contact-form-7/tags/7.2.0/)
- [WordPress.org repository: PDF Invoice for WooCommerce, tag 7.2.0](https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/pdf-for-woocommerce/tags/7.2.0/)
- [mPDF on GitHub](https://github.com/mpdf/mpdf)
- [NVD: CVE-2026-102435](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102435)
- [NVD: CVE-2026-109220](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109220)
- [Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7 in the WP Vanguard vulnerability database](https://wpvanguard.com/vulnerabilities/plugin/ultimate-addons-for-contact-form-7)
